Amid widespread media reports of the attack, the company estimated that it would be able to bring its SaaS severs back online between 4 p. EDT on July 6.
Kaseya began configuring an additional layer of security to its SaaS infrastructure to change the underlying IP address of its VSA servers, allowing them to gradually come back online. However, upon rollout, an issue was discovered, delaying the release. Operations teams worked through the night to fix the issue with an update due the following morning. An update on the on-premises patch stated that 24 hours or less remained the estimated timescale.
Kaseya published a guide for on-premises customers to prepare for the patch launch and stated that a new update from Voccola was to be emailed to users clarifying the current situation. The company apologized for ongoing delays with SaaS and on-premises fix deployment.
She also said that another ransomware-focused meeting between the two countries was scheduled for the following week. Meanwhile, Kaseya set a new estimate of Sunday July 11 for the launch of the on-premises patch, while it was starting deployment to its SaaS infrastructure. Kaseya released two update videos, one from Voccola and another from CTO Dan Timpson, addressing the situation, progress, and next steps. The company also warned of spammers exploiting the incident by sending phishing emails with fake notifications containing malicious links and attachments.
It stated that it would not send any email updates containing links or attachments. He also raised awareness of ongoing, suspicious communications coming from outside Kaseya.
Kaseya said it remained on course to release the on-premises patch and have its SaaS infrastructure online by Sunday July 11 at 4 p. The latest video update from Sanders outlined steps companies could take to prepare for the launch. The Huntress team has since validated this patch, which was dubbed 9. With this patch installed, our previous proof-of-concept exploit now fails—and we believe the attack vector is no longer present. We will send out a follow-up with details.
The Huntress team has validated the released Kaseya patch, dubbed 9. You can install the patch with the "KInstall. Installing the patch does suggest a Windows Update if you have not recently installed the latest updates from Microsoft. From our testing, installing the patch took approximately 10 minutes. After logging back into the VSA service, you are prompted to change your password to meet the new policy requirements.
Our team is working to validate the patch and will have more updates soon. Kaseya has released an on-premise playbook as well as a SaaS playbook for recovery efforts. Our current concern is that if organizations shut down their on-premise VSA servers, there could be a chance that these systems are powered off in a state with pending jobs still queued to ransom more downstream endpoints once connectivity is restored. We believe it is vitally important to remove these pending jobs prior to reenabling connectivity.
Once a patch is released, the Huntress team will have more updates to share. Although the hackers did not deliver an implant with their exploit, the latter half of the video illustrates how it could have been done used MSFVenom to generate a Meterpreter binary and caught the callback with pwncat.
We've received a ton of requests from compromised MSPs to detail what actions the hackers did after compromising a VSA database. Although we cannot say for certain what they did to your database, this is what we discovered across the ones we analyzed:. Function 26 : They retrieved the path to the agent working directory and stored the value in the agentWrkDir variable. Function 26 : They created the variable diffSec and stored the constant default value of 1 second.
Function 7 : They executed the commands we posted included below for posterity. The ping sleeps for the amount of time computed in the Step 4, which effectively coordinates a synchronized attack at exactly UTC across all victims. However, the huge kudos goes to the MSPs who decided to share their data for the greater good of the community.
We would not have been able to piece this puzzle together this without you! At approximately ET this morning, our team received fragments of the Screenshot.
This Screenshot. Unfortunately, a large portion of the code is removed as the original IDS had not retrieved the full packet. This explains the previous activity we have seen across all compromised organizations. Then input ncpa. Step 5 : Check Validate settings upon exit and then click OK to save the changes you have made.
Then you can check if the error is removed. Step 2 : In File Explorer , click Documents. Step 3 : Right-click the 4e9ab subfolder and select Delete.
Download Partition Wizard. If you are in an offline environment i. Related Document: Patches' Shavlik Name. After the patches are Copied to the Target machine, a batch file that contains the necessary installation switches is also copied to the target.
The last thing the Batch file will do after it runs, is rename itself from a. BAT extension to a. HIS extension. If the extension has changed, that indicates the patches should have all been executed thought not necessarily successfully. Open the Cl5. There should be an entry that looks similar to this: T If the patch is installed successfully, it returns '0'.
If the patch requires a reboot, it returns ''. If the patch returns any other code, it is an error and the code needs to be troubleshot. The error will typically be searchable online for what it corresponds with. Alternatively, trying to run the patch manually should give you a prompt indicating the error. Example: This is a successful install of the patch 7zx If the Cl5.
If searching online does not yield an answer to what the exit code means, running the patch manually will usually provide an error message to troubleshoot from. Double click the file to run it. Often times the error will be immediate upon running, where some patches require clicking through several steps before the error occurs.
Note: If the patch does not return an error, the may install successfully. If this occurs, in order to troubleshoot why it failed to install from Protect, the patch must first be uninstalled so a reinstall of the patch via Protect can occur for testing purposes. Most patch install failures will meet one of the listed criteria.
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